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1
There is an underlying tension between the notion of cognitive enhancement and the
idea that knowledge presupposes creditable agency. By drawing on an Aristotelian
theory of action, it becomes clear that cognition is routinely considered as a human
activity susceptible to kinds of appraisal, to which mere physiological processes,
such as digestion, are not. In essence, we appreciate knowledge as a distinctive
achievement. It includes good epistemic outcomes that are also epistemically
creditable, as opposed to others that, although attributable to an epistemic agent, are,
nevertheless, epistemically null.
In contrast, the term ‘‘cognitive enhancement’’ is related primarily to physio-
logical and, more speciﬁcally, neuronal processes. It covers various medical
techniques, including pharmacological interventions, brain stimulation and genetic
manipulation that can modify neuronal functions and, possibly, convey certain
epistemic beneﬁts.
1 Examples are prolonged attention span and memory retention.
As a result, the issue of cognitive enhancement is typically addressed within its
dedicated ﬁeld of neuroethics.
2 Considerations of distributive justice, such as fair
access to enhancing procedures often come to the forefront of the discussion.
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freedoms.
4 Although such concerns will not be directly addressed in the following
discussion, their relevance to the existing debate will be indicated in conclusion.
The following analysis builds upon an Aristotelian theory of action as applied to
epistemic pursuits.
5 In this respect, it shares some background assumptions with
virtue epistemology, such as a general understanding of knowledge as an apt,
creditable performance.
6 This, however, does not conﬁne the conclusions to
this particular theory of knowledge. They are consistent with any theory, which
distinguishes between the successful exercise of someone’s intellectual abilities and
sheer epistemic luck.
2
The idea that intellectual achievement is constitutive of knowledge casts doubt onto
the notion of good epistemic luck. The correct conclusions that a person reaches
without employing a relevant skill can hardly be to her epistemic credit. On this
occasion, the person is not to be congratulated as knowledgeable, although it may
still be pleasing that she got things right rather than wrong. With respect to
epistemic credit, purported chance seems on a par with bad luck. This initial
observation will be explored in the following series of contrasting thought-
experiments. The underlying thought is to ﬁrstly suggest that cognitive enhancement
is an instance of good epistemic luck and then to identify possible ways, in which it
may undermine epistemic achievement.
Linda Zagzebski presents an example in the style of cases set out by Harry
Frankfurt, in which a benign manipulator ensures that a prospective knower believes
only truths.
7 In the scenario at issue, the manipulator monitors the belief formation
of the manipulated agent and intervenes, unbeknown to her, only if she is on the
verge of acquiring a false belief. The prospective knower ends up holding only true
beliefs. Yet, her epistemic agency is undermined by the implicit manipulation of her
reasoning. The reliability that it conveys cannot substitute for the loss of epistemic
initiative, which is indispensable for gaining epistemic credit.
The preceding scenario prompts a different conclusion from that suggested by the
analysis of the original Black and Jones case proposed by Frankfurt, which unfolds
as follows: ‘‘Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain
4 See Carl Elliott, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2003); and Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic
Engineering (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
5 See Lubomira Radoilska, L’Actualite ´ d’Aristote en morale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2007), pp. 191–290.
6 See John Greco, ‘‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,’’ in Michael R. DePaul and Linda Zagzebski,
eds., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press);
see also Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology. Vol. 1: Apt Belief and Reﬂective Knowledge (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
7 See Linda Zagzebski, ‘‘Must Knowers Be Agents?’’, in Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, eds.,
Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), pp. 149–152.
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123action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers
to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits up until Jones is about to make
up his mind, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent
judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what
he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do
something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do and
that he does do, what he wants him to do…. Now suppose that Black never has to
show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does
perform the very action that Black wants him to perform.’’
8 The resulting action is
clearly attributable to Jones. Hence, concludes Frankfurt, Jones is fully responsible
for it and Black’s power to make him perform it all the same cannot serve as an
excuse.
Although correct, this conclusion is potentially misleading if extrapolated to the
earlier epistemic case. The reason for this is provided by two important asymmetries:
the ﬁrst between the two alternatives in the original scenario and the second between
the second alternative and the epistemic setting of benign manipulation. In the case
outlined by Frankfurt, Jones effectively performs the action intentionally. Being
unaware of Black’s ability to intervene, he does not even act under duress. Hence,
Black’s presence does not constitute a mitigating circumstance. Yet, if Jones is made
to perform the action by Black, his responsibility as an agent will not be engaged
because this action will not be of his doing in the relevant sense. Here, the particular
outcome that Jones brings about is attributable to him only causally. Hence, although
the consequences of both alternatives are identical, they stand in a very different
relation to Jones.
Crucially, the asymmetry will not be cancelled out even if Black were to
intervene in order to make sure that Jones realizes his own intention, for instance, by
rectifying Jones’s failure to carry out his plan. This modiﬁed scenario is relevantly
similar to the example of a clumsy killer who tries to shoot someone dead, misses
the victim by a mile, but his shot stampedes a herd of wild pigs that, as a result,
trample his intended target to death.
9 The case clearly indicates that the match
between preceding intention and a wished-for result does not sufﬁce in order to
make this attributable to the agent as such rather than as a mere physical cause. Still,
most of us will be inclined to hold responsible both the clumsy killer and Jones from
the modiﬁed scenario. Yet, the blame that may be plausibly assigned to them
pertains to what they have tried to do. Both are guilty of attempted murder, but the
accidental deaths of their intended victims cannot be pinned on them. Neither is to
blame for the coincidental fulﬁllment of his blameworthy intent.
This point is directly related to the second asymmetry mentioned above. Unlike
the story of benign manipulation, the cases introduced by Frankfurt are about
attributing negative responsibility, or blame. For instance, it is often stipulated that
the action Black wants to see through is an assassination that Jones has agreed to
8 Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’’ Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 66 (1969), pp. 835–836.
9 Donald Davidson, ‘‘Freedom to Act,’’ in Donald Davidson, ed., Actions and Events (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980), p. 78.
An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement 367
123carry out.
10 However, the conditions for blame attribution are signiﬁcantly less
stringent than the conditions for crediting, or praising an agent. People may be
plausibly held to account not only for intentional actions and their foreseeable
consequences, but also for the results of avoidable omissions and negligent behavior.
As suggested by the status of attempted murder as a criminal offence, negative
responsibility may sometimes be engaged even though the agent was unsuccessful in
carrying out her intended action. In contrast, full credit is attributable primarily to
agents who successfully realize their praiseworthy intentions. This is consistent with
the intuitive idea that credit should also be given to agents whose failure is due to
unforeseeable circumstance. Apparent counterexamples, such as praise given for
refraining from certain actions, arise from conﬂating the praised behavior and its
outward consequences. In such cases, the agent is credited for successfully resisting a
temptation that most people would have given in to. Carrying out the decision to stay
away from temptation is the actual object of praise, not the by-product of having
done nothing wrong.
The asymmetry between negative responsibility and praise indicates that there
may be nothing epistemically benign in the case of benign manipulation. Here,
Black harms Jones qua epistemic agent in two distinct ways. The ﬁrst type of harm
is related to robbing Jones of the epistemic credit that she could have gained if she
were left to correct her mistaken beliefs by herself. By preventing the formation of
Jones’s potentially false beliefs, Black also limits her opportunities to gain full
epistemic credit on speciﬁc occasions.
The second type of harm becomes apparent if the thought-experiment is
considered from a long-term perspective. Black’s regular interventions would make
it increasingly difﬁcult to give full epistemic credit to Jones even for her true beliefs
that are not the direct result of manipulation. The systematic interference with her
reasoning makes it impossible to isolate some beliefs as autonomously formed.
Furthermore, it prevents Jones from developing critical skills which presuppose the
real possibility of error. Yet, such skills are epistemically essential. Without them,
Jones cannot be considered as knowledgeable, although she might be treated as a
reliable source of information.
This type of harm is far-reaching and affects Jones’s very status of a prospective
knower, since her getting things right is fundamentally compromised from an
epistemic perspective. Such deep epistemic harm is, nevertheless, compatible with
certain pragmatic beneﬁts that Jones may receive as a result of holding only true
beliefs. Arguably, her planning will be improved to the extent that it does not build
upon false premises. The beneﬁts, however, do not offset the underlying damage of
having her epistemic agency systematically undermined. The reason for this is that
intentional agency is inseparable from the exercise of our intellectual abilities and
largely depends on the success of various epistemic pursuits. In this sense, Jones’s
manipulated acquisition of true beliefs is not only epistemically corruptive, but may
also, in the long run, compromise her overall standing as a fully creditable agent.
The link between the two will become clearer at the concluding stages of the
10 See David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities:
Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003).
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123argument, where the possibility to accomplish epistemic goals by extraneous means
will be related to an underlying disposition to appreciate worthy abilities and
activities only for the sake of something else. This disposition alone will be shown
to adversely affect the nature of someone’s achievements.
3
The two types of harm identiﬁed earlier seem unavoidable even if the thought-
experiment were modiﬁed so that Black either intervenes with Jones’s prior consent,
or they were one and the same person. The case of Black intervening would
resemble the clumsy killer: Black’s intervention would bring about a result that
accords with Jones’s prior intention of getting things right, whenever Jones is likely
to fail realizing it. The true beliefs that Jones acquires on account of Black will not
be epistemically creditable to Jones. Nevertheless, she might deserve credit for
enlisting Black’s assistance. The credit may be even partly epistemic if Jones is
responsible for her correct opinion about Black’s unfailing epistemic prowess.
Yet, a continual reliance on Black would indicate an implicit ﬂaw of the
epistemic project that Jones is pursuing. Her underlying intention to persistently
come to believe only truths is at odds with a commitment to epistemic achievement
to the extent that she accepts Black’s interference as a possible substitute to the
exercise of her own intellectual abilities. This intention is indeterminate in a
signiﬁcant way. It is epistemic only as a goal, not as a plan for its realization. It
prepares the ground for these ‘‘two faces of intention’’ to fall apart.
11 Jones’s
epistemic agency is, therefore, put at risk from having her goals realized by means,
which detract from her epistemic credit and belie her seemingly strong epistemic
commitment to believing only truths. Her prior consent does not cancel out these
eventualities. It only turns them into more complex cases where epistemic harm and
self-harm are intertwined, for Black and Jones are complicit in undermining Jones
as a self-standing knower. This observation will be reﬁned in the following
discussion of partial or derivative credit for actions involving self-binding.
The situation would not change, in an epistemically relevant sense, if it is
assumed that Black and Jones are one and the same person, Jones presenting her
capacity qua prospective knower, Black standing for her broader intentional agency.
Less artiﬁcially, Black could be replaced with a kind of device that Jones can readily
employ. This could be a calculator or a performance-enhancing drug. Both cases are
consistent with some epistemic self-harm: ﬁrstly, by diminishing Jones’s epistemic
credit for the resulting performance, and, secondly, by eventually altering her
attitude toward epistemic achievement.
The ﬁrst point is straightforward. When Jones gets the answer of a complex
multiplication by using a calculator, she does not exhibit mathematical compe-
tence. This does not mean that Jones does not know the correct answer. Yet, the
knowledge is second-hand and relevantly dissimilar from that of a mathematically
skilful person who gets the answer on her own. On such occasions, Jones may
11 See Michael Bratman, ‘‘Two Faces of Intention,’’ Philosophical Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, (1984).
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developing a relevant intellectual skill. The related loss of opportunity and
resulting epistemic harm may sometimes be trivial, or well worth undergoing.
Developing expertise in one ﬁeld at the expense of neglecting others is an
example. This, however, does not undermine the general claim that some
epistemic loss is incurred. The analogy with cases of benign manipulation is not
meant to suggest that the use of a calculator implies some form of self-deception
or manipulation. Instead, it only highlights an epistemic harm relevant to both
cases, which is related to the fact that the epistemic outcomes are not fully
creditable to the agent and in this sense do not constitute an unambiguous
epistemic achievement.
The second point is more complex. It indicates a plausible link between a
person’s inclination to conceive her epistemic aims primarily in terms of desirable
end-results and the risk of becoming less than fully creditable epistemic agent. The
risk need not involve any decline in epistemic proﬁciency, such as reduced literacy
and numeracy associated with extensive use of automatic spell-checkers and
calculators, though it is consistent with such a decline. The relevant kind of harm
stems from interpreting epistemic intentions as goals rather than plans, as this may
alter the nature of the ﬁnal achievement, independently of whether the actual
epistemic route is creditable or not. Both kinds of action may lead to nearly identical
outcomes, yet, the credit due to the agent varies, since each kind of action exhibits a
different type of agential involvement.
The medical interventions considered as cognitive enhancements would affect
epistemic achievement in relevantly similar ways. To the extent that they effectively
modify a person’s epistemic performance, they diminish the credit that is due to her
as an agent. The fact that such cognitive enhancements are internal rather than
external like calculators is beside the point. Their efﬁcacy would equally lead to at
least partial loss of epistemic credit. It may be objected that when a person takes so-
called smart drugs, pharmacological products that allow her to continue working at
peak capacity for longer hours, the end results should still be credited to her, since
no external agency has been involved. However, the lack of intervention from
outside is only a necessary condition for crediting an agent with an action. The
previous example of a clumsy killer indicates that an action may be attributable to
an agent and possibly engage her full responsibility without at the same time being
creditable to her.
So called smart drugs and other kinds of cognitive enhancement are to be
distinguished from epistemically enabling conditions, which provide prospective
knowers with opportunities to both expand their competence and acquire proper
credit. In order to satisfy them, the Black and Jones scenarios have to be
signiﬁcantly adjusted so that Black’s presence encourages Jones to take on bolder
epistemic tasks. Here, Black’s role is to double-check Jones’s results and to alert her
when she is incorrect. Thus, Jones gets things right on her own, under Black’s expert
supervision. Black’s interventions neither detract from Jones’s epistemic credit, nor
jeopardize her prospects of becoming a self-standing epistemic agent. The situation
is relevantly similar to a successful interaction between a teacher and a pupil. If
Black and Jones were one and the same person, the analogy would require that she,
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various dictionaries and reading more widely.
As indicated by possible calculator uses, the same device may bring epistemic
discredit with respect to certain tasks and, yet, serve as an enabling condition with
respect to others. Relativity to speciﬁc projects does not undermine the signiﬁcance
of the underlying distinction, but effectively highlights its suitability for the
appraisal of particular epistemic performances. This point equally applies to
delegating epistemic responsibility to others. The delegating agents may deserve
epistemic credit for placing their trust intelligently, however, the tasks that they
have handed over will not be to their epistemic credit. With respect to cognitive
enhancements, such as so-called smart drugs, this implies the possibility for partial
epistemic credit reﬂecting the scope of actual agential involvement. Consequently,
whenever the causal efﬁcacy of purported enhancements turns out to be negligible,
the epistemic agent should receive full credit for the speciﬁc achievement. Yet, even
in such instances the use of cognitive enhancements potentially undermines the
person as a fully creditable epistemic agent, since it weakens her commitment to
epistemic pursuits as a distinctive kind of achievement.
4
The preceding Black and Jones thought-experiments illustrate four separate
categories of actions, corresponding to increasingly stringent conditions of agential
involvement: caused by the agent, attributable to her, responsible, and creditable
actions. The ﬁrst category is the most inclusive. It comprises both the sets of the
remaining three and a further subset, excluded by them. The further subset is related
to actions that are merely caused by an agent. Her involvement is purely
instrumental, as in the scenarios in which Jones is made to perform, unbeknown to
her, a particular action. It is fully attributable to Black, but involuntary, from Jones’s
perspective. Here, Jones is an agent only in the qualiﬁed sense of a causative
substance, in which we speak of a chemical agent. The question of agential
responsibility is not applicable to her.
The second category, actions attributed to an agent qua agent, brings this
question in. Yet, it is still too inclusive and allows for instances, in which the agent’s
putative responsibility is, ﬁnally, not engaged. The clumsy killer is an example.
Although he brings about the death of his intended victim, this occurs in an
unforeseeable way. Being the effect of an intentional action of his, the victim’s end
is attributable to him. It belongs to what Donald Davidson called the ‘‘completion of
his action.’’
12 Nevertheless, it does not engage the killer’s responsibility as it would
have, were he a better shot and actually hit his target. With respect to the caused
fatality, the clumsy killer’s involvement is relevantly similar to that of someone who
trains for a shooting competition in a remote area and whose shots cause a herd of
wild pigs to stampede, trampling an unexpected walker to death. A pertinent Black
and Jones scenario would be as follows. Jones goes ahead with the assassination and
12 Donald Davidson, op. cit., p. 71.
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secretly intervene.
The third category reﬂects a further condition, that of feasible agential control,
which, however, should not be direct, nor lasting from beginning to end. This
requirement both sets apart responsible from merely attributable actions and avoids
the unnecessary assumption of a concurrent alternative, criticized by Frankfurt.
13 It
includes the foreseeable, though not foreseen effects of our intentional actions, but
rules out the improbable developments, to which they might, in fact, give rise. The
foreseeable effects do not presuppose the agent’s ability to prevent them from
happening, once the related intention has been acted upon. In the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle makes a similar point about responsibility for character traits: once
a stable disposition vis-a `-vis a particular object has been acquired, going against it
may no longer be within the agent’s remit.
14 For instance, if stinginess has become a
person’s deﬁning attitude toward money, it may be nearly impossible to display
generosity, even on the rare occasions when she would like to do so. Yet, this does
not exonerate mean individuals as long as their fault can be traced to previous
choices. Although possibly unintended, stinginess is the natural ending of a series of
intentional steps. It is, therefore, of the agent’s doing and implies full responsibility,
as opposed to mere attributability.
This analysis can be usefully extended to actions. It provides a plausible
justiﬁcation for cases, in which culpability is deemed to increase by virtue of
relinquishing agential control for the culpable action. Causing an accident when
driving drunk is an example. Not only is the offender held responsible for the
accident that, in all likelihood, she was unable to prevent; putting herself out of
control further aggravates her charge. The current practice of excluding addiction
from the range of mitigating circumstances runs in a similar vein: a general duty to
maintain self-control is implied; hence, being out of control provides ground for
accusation rather than exculpation.
15
A Black and Jones analogy would require that Jones enters a no exit clause
agreement with Black, according to which Black will make him carry out the
assassination even if he changes his mind and no longer wants to go along with this
murderous plan. As anticipated by Jones, he does have a last minute change of heart.
Black, however, fulﬁlls his part of the deal and the assassination takes place. Jones’s
responsibility is engaged all the same, if not made even greater by his sinister pact
to make sure that the murder gets done.
In some ways, the preceding scenario resembles the instances of self-binding,
studied by Jon Elster.
16 These comprise different strategies that less than fully
rational agents may employ in order to avoid catastrophe, like Ulysses, who could
13 See Harry G. Frankfurt, op. cit.
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan
Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1114a4–22.
15 See Gary Watson, ‘‘Excusing Addiction,’’ Law and Philosophy, Vol. 18, (1999), pp. 597–598.
16 See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1984) and Ulysses
Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
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123not succumb to the Syrens’ temptation because his faithful companions, following
his demand, kept him tied to the ship’s mast. This classical story illustrates well the
two deﬁning features of self-binding. Firstly, it involves correct self-assessment as
being unable to deal with a particular weakness, such as insatiable curiosity in the
case of Ulysses. Secondly, the identiﬁed weakness is tackled by delegating control
to reliable others. Thus, self-binding satisﬁes the conditions of feasible agential
control, as outlined earlier. In this respect, it is alike the preceding Black and Jones
variation. Furthermore, it suggests that feasible agential control may sometimes
sufﬁce for attributing not only negative responsibility, but also credit for actions.
For instances of self-binding clearly exhibit a kind of achievement. It enables agents
to counterbalance their own limitations and circumvent anticipated disaster.
This point supports the conclusions that were reached earlier. There, achieving an
epistemic goal either via Black’s intervention or via some enhancing technique was
suggested not conducive to full epistemic credit. This can now be explained as a
kind of self-binding, by which an agent may get round some cognitive deﬁciency
and secure an epistemically valuable result. Yet, self-binding leads to no more than
a derivative praise since the agent is, effectively, credited for avoiding foreseeable
blame. Her achievement is conditional on a persistent ﬂaw. She resists temptation,
but does not display self-restraint. The warranted credit does not extend to the
quality, which she clearly lacks. A further limitation on praise for self-binding
comes from the fact that it may reinforce the particular weakness, it helps the agent
to cope with. By alleviating its detrimental consequences, self-binding makes it less
urgent to address the weakness itself. Self-binding is, therefore, a fundamentally
ambivalent kind of achievement. It is consistent with both types of self-harm,
identiﬁed earlier. This marks a crucial difference with enabling conditions, which
warrant full agential credit.
5
Conditions warranting full agential credit are distinguishing features of the fourth
category of actions. It presupposes a more demanding agential involvement than
just feasible control. This leaves out many aspects of broader responsibility, such as
backﬁring activities, negligent actions, and failures to act in a particular way. In
contrast, in order to be creditable, an action has to both realize certain value and
express the agent’s commitment to it. Obvious examples are morally virtuous
actions, which Aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics.
17 Being expressive of
a relevant quality, or virtue of the agent partly deﬁnes such actions. For instance,
remaining calm in the face of danger should not to be praised as an act of courage,
unless it is done out of courage. Conversely, outwardly identical behavior, due to
taking a pill that suppresses the emotional response to the situation, should not be
considered as courageous, since it does not display a worthy disposition vis-a `-vis
danger. The two courses of action may have the same effects, yet, they
fundamentally differ in both nature and value. Only the action done out of courage
17 See Aristotle, op. cit., 1105a26–b1.
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courage. The action due to taking a pill cannot be to the agent’s credit in the same
respect. It displays her indifference to the value of courage. This conﬁnes it to the
status of a secondary action, or poiesis, the value of which is fully reducible to that
of its consequences.
18 Thus, agential lack of commitment to a pertinent value,
which, on such an occasion, is courage, both devalues and downgrades her action.
As a result, it cannot qualify as an action proper, or praxis, which is also worthy
independently from its desirable effects. Secondary actions lack this immediate and
indissoluble connection to value. They are creditable only conditionally, in so far as
they bring about consequences of some worth.
This suggests that full agential credit depends, to a considerable degree, on the
agent’s competence as a valuer. We are unable to creditably instantiate values that
fall outside our evaluative spectrum and should not be credited for inadvertently
promoting them. This, however, neither makes relevant actions inattributable to an
agent, nor precludes them from being creditable to her in another sense: as a self-
binding, secondary action, or even, an instantiation of an alternative, accessible to
the agent, value.
In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle provides a helpful example, which he calls the
Spartan disposition.
19 This is a special case of moral snobbery, where character
virtues are appreciated exclusively for their overall beneﬁcial effects. Their
perceived value is, therefore, reduced to that of a competitive advantage in the
pursuit of social status and wealth. From the Spartan perspective, the value of
courage resides in the good prospects of meeting our goals in spite of adversity.
Similarly, the worth of temperance is conﬁned to its anticipated pay-off, such as
staying beyond reproach. Importantly, the resulting behavior is not without merit. It
is a decent pursuit of social advancement, which does not employ violent, corrupt,
or devious means. Yet, it is fundamentally deﬁcient. It leaves out the independent,
moral worth of character virtues and, therefore, fails to implement it. In this respect,
the so-called Spartan motivation importantly downgrades the prospective achieve-
ment and credit that the agent could get. It excludes the distinctive accomplishment
and reward, which come through the exercise of a virtue. Conversely, the
appreciation and practice of ethical virtues as valuable in themselves is compatible
with a commitment to further pursuits, such as prosperity. It allows for a broader
range of creditable options than the Spartan disposition.
The appeal of cognitive enhancement implies an analogous attitude toward
epistemic achievement. Intellectual virtues in the broad sense of outstanding
intellectual qualities are appreciated primarily for the anticipated social advantage,
which, though steadily associated with their exercise, remains epistemically
peripheral. As a result, the perceived value of intellectual virtues is essentially
conﬁned to that of a competitive edge in an underlying rivalry for excludable goods,
such as prestige and fortune. This is consistent with the focus on fairness, which
18 See ibid. 1140a1–19.
19 See Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. J. Solomon, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan
Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1248b–49a18.
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20 From this
perspective, cognitive enhancements may provide, as long as they are sufﬁciently
reliable, just the same desirable outcomes. The outcomes, however, are mere by-
products of intellectual achievement. This point applies, mutatis mutandis, even to
technical expertise and practical know-how. Their exercise is also worthwhile in its
ownright,independentlyoftheirsought-afterresults.Insofarasthisexerciserealizes
a valuable disposition, it qualiﬁes as an action proper, not only as a secondary action.
Following this line of thought it becomes apparent that the notion of cognitive
enhancement implies a Spartan-like attitude to cognition. Thus, epistemic harm is
already instigated by the failure to appreciate intellectual achievement in its own
right. In this respect, the very framing of the cognitive enhancement debate in
distributive terms such as fair access may be epistemically undermining.
21
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20 See John Harris, op. cit. See also Maartje Schermer, ‘‘On the Argument that Enhancement is
‘Cheating’,’’ Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 34, No. 2, (2008).
21 I would like to thank Jane Heal, Ulrich Muller, Hallvard Lillehammer, the anonymous referees and
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